Life Insurance -- Military Service -- Military Exclusion Clauses and Death From Nonmilitary Causes by Pelletier, George A.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 1 Article 4
12-1-1960
Life Insurance -- Military Service -- Military
Exclusion Clauses and Death From Nonmilitary
Causes
George A. Pelletier
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation




LIFE INSURANCE - MILITARY SERVICE - MILITARY EXCLUSION CLAUSES
AND DEATH FROM NONMILITARY CAUSES
Introduction
Life insurance premium rates find their justification in fatality experience,
within defined areas of coverage. The premium rate represents the culmination
of a statistical and mathematical process by which a calculated income safely
but reasonably exceeds administrative cost and foreseeable payments. Implicit in
this prediction is the exclusion of areas where the risk is so unpredictable as to
negate the possibility of the normal statistical accuracy. The war risk or military
exclusion clause seeks to avoid such a risk in that it represents an awareness on
the part of insurance companies of the hazards inherent in military service, particu-
larly in time of war.
Military exclusion clauses were used as long ago as the Civil War where
extra premiums were charged on the basis of proximity to the war zone.' World
War I brought into existence the modem types of military exclusion clauses. The
exclusion clause as it was developed during these wars sought to protect the in-
surance companies from the added risk of death due to war, which the companies
in their actuarial planning, on the basis of normal experience, had not taken into
consideration. 2 Some companies have not limited their exclusion clauses to war
time but have made military service, regardless of whether in time of war or
peace, the criterion of the clause.3 The change has occurred as a result of cold,
limited or undeclared, war, where deaths often occur as a result of military causes
but are not excluded under the war clause. However, the insured while in military
service is not without life insurance protection; various government legislation
has been enacted, the most recent example being the National Service Life Insurance
Act of 1958.
4
An increasingly important problem area is the applicability of war or military
exclusion clauses when the insured, while in the military service, is killed from
causes not peculiar to the military service, but equally likely to occur in civilian
life. Cases in this area often arise when the insured dies as a result of disease,
or from ordinary accidents while on furlough. Analytically, this is an ordinary
risk the insurance companies are being paid to assume, but often the exclusion
clause is so worded that it denies coverage. The scope of this note is a re-examina-
tion of the case law on the liability of the insurer under various military service
exemption clauses where the death has resulted from a risk not peculiar to, or
characteristic of, military service.
The purpose is more than to describe the particular areas of conflict. Some
attempt at a synthesis of judicial attitudes towards the clauses will be made, with
a view toward discarding the rationalization of conflicting results by recourse to
the particular language of the individual clauses.
General Rules Of Interpretation
The validity of a war or military exclusion clause is universally recognized
1 KRUEGER AND WAGGONER, THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CONTRACT § 18.3 (1953).
2 Insurance companies cannot afford to insure war risks at peace-time rates.
Such a practice would discriminate unjustly against policy holders not
engaging in military service, would be indefensible as a business policy,
and ought not to be permitted on grounds of public policy. Lofstead v.
Bank Savings Life Ins. Co., 118 Kan. 95, 234 Pac. 50, 52 (1925).
3 See uniform military exclusion clause of the state of New York, N.Y. INS. LAw §
155(2) (b) (Supp. 1960); Report of the War Clause Subcommittee of the Life Committee,
1952 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 106;
Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n., 138 Ark. 442, 212 S.W. 310 (1919); O'Daniell v.
Missouri Ins. Co., 24 Ill. App. 2d 10, 164 N.E.2d 78 (1959).
4 38 U.S.C. §§ 701-788 (1958), which provides life insurance of up to $10,000 for
members of the military service.
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and has been declared not contrary to public policy.' They are either ex-
pressly permitted by statute,6 or their validity is founded on common law free-
dom to contract.
7
Military exclusion clauses vary considerably from one company to another,
which is unusual for a clause used so frequently. The entry of the insured into
the military service may relieve the insurer of a double indemnity provision, limit
the amount payable to the legal reserve of the policy, or the cash surrender value,
or the return of the premiums paid, or the policy may be suspended during such
service. In interpreting the various clauses the principal issue is usually whether
the clause is of the status type, where the entry into the service is sufficient to
limit the liability of the insurer, or whether it is a result clause, which demands
a causal relationship between the fact of war or service and the death of the
insured.
The courts, when interpreting military exclusion clauses, apply the same rules
of construction as they would to any other clause of an insurance contract." Pri-
marily it must be remembered that the intention of the parties is controlling, but
if this intention appears ambiguous then it will be resolved against the insurer
as the maker of the instrument. However, this does not allow a rewriting of the
contract under the guise of legal construction. Certain terms in military exclu-
sion clauses have been found susceptible of ambiguity: words such as "engaged,"
"risk," "resulting from," "in consequence of," and "active service." Policies
have also been held ambiguous on the basis of either another military clause, an
aviation clause, or some other clause in the policy. 9 Furthermore, clauses pro-
viding for forfeitures upon entry into military service are not favored. 1 Words
in a life insurance policy are to be given their commonly accepted meaning,
1 2
although there is some precedent holding that the terms in such a clause should
be given their technical meaning. 13
Status Clauses
Status clauses preclude the liability of the insurer upon a finding that the
insured at the time of his death was within the defined area of exemption. The
insurer under a broad status clause is immune during the entire period the in-
sured is in the military service regardless of the cause of the insured's death. Some
of the clauses are less inclusive, as where the insurance company is protected
when the death occurs outside the home area while the insured is in the military
service.
Generally, an insured will be considered to be in the military service once
he has passed the required examinations, taken his oath, been enrolled, and has
5 Trimble v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 83 Ohio App. 102, 82 N.E.2d 548
(1948); Jorgenson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 136 N.J.L. 148, 55 A.2d 2 (1947); Selenack
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 160 Pa. Super. 242, 50 A.2d 736 (1947).
6 See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 73 § 836(1)(c) (Supp. 1959); N.Y. INS. LAw § 155
(2)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1960); Tzx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.44 (1952).
7 Freedom of contract seems to necessarily involve the right of the insurer
to determine and specify the risks against which it is willing to insure
another. The freedom of the insured is protected by his right to accept or
reject the offered contract. Badanjak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Pa.
D. & C. 559, 572 (1944).
8 Caruso v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 25 N.J. Misc. 318, 53 A.2d 222 (1947),
aff'd, 136 N.J.L. 597, 57 A.2d 359 (1948).
9 See Bending v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N.E.2d 71 (1944).
10 See Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 1018, 1066-70 (1954).
11 Jorgenson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 136 N.J.L. 148, 55 A.2d 2, 4 (1947).
12 Saladino v. Prudential Ins. Co., 188 Misc. 601, 68 N.Y.S.2d 35, appeal dismissed with-
out opinion (App. Div.), 70 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1946).
13 Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202 (1953); Rosenau
v. Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944).
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subjected himself to the orders of the military.14 Where "active service' is re-
quired, rather than just "service," the language has been interpreted to mean
active duty before the enemy and hence does not include training periods.'8
On the other hand, a person is in the military service until he is discharged; this
includes furloughs and other time away from actual duty.:"
Status clauses usually contain some form of the phrase "while in military
or naval service" and usually an added limitation, "in time of war" or "of any
country engaged in war." As mentioned earlier, the advent of "cold" or unde-
clared war has caused many companies to drop this war reservation. The follow-
ing illustrative cases involve status clauses where the insured's death resulted
from causes not peculiar to military service and the clauses in question were found
to be unambiguous in their delimitation of coverage.
In Trimble v. Western and Southern .Life Ins. Co.y17 the insured while in
military service but on furlough was killed in an automobile accident. The policy
provided for an accidental death benefit which would not apply where the fatal
injuries "are sustained while the insured is in the military or naval service in
time of war."' s
In Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McLeod, 9 the policy provided:
The insured may serve in the navy or army of the United States or in the
National Guard in time of peace or for the purpose of maintaining order
in case of riot; in time of actual war, however, a written permit must be
obtained from the company for such service and an extra premium paid.
Should the insured die while enrolled in such service in war time without
such permit, the company's liability will be restricted to the net reserve
of this policy.20
The insured when he entered the Navy did not obtain the required permit, and
while on leave was stabbed to death in a fight. The court reasoned:
While (the insured) may not have been subject to the hazards of naval
service while on leave, his status as a sailor remained unchanged; and
under the express provisions of the policy, his status is made the ground
for the restriction of liability of the company, and not the risks or hazard
of the insured at the time of his death.2'
In Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n,2 2 the insured's death resulted from
pneumonia while he was stationed at an Army camp in the United States. The
court held applicable a clause which provided:
This policy shall be incontestable two years from its date, except for
nonpayment of premium calls or death while engaged in or caused by vio-
lation of the law or while in the service of the army or navy of any gov-
ernment, which is not a risk covered at any time during continuance or
reinstatement of this policy, for any greater sum than the amount actually
paid to the association thereon.23
Feick v. Prudential Ins. Co., 2 4 represents one of the broadest extensions of
the status clause exemption. There the insured, who was a 17-year-old college
student enrolled in the Navy V-12 program, suffered fatal injuries in an automo-
14 Feick v. Prudential Ins. Co., 1 N.J. Super. 88, 62 A.2d 485 (1948); Bending v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N.E.2d 71 (1944); Ruddock v. Detroit
Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N.W. 242 (1920).
15 In Redd v. American Cent. Life Ins. Co., 200 Mo. App. 383, 207 S.W. 74 (1918),
it was held that death of insured from pneumonia while at a training camp was not death
in "active service."
16 "One is in the military service from the time he takes the oath until he receives his
discharge, honorable or otherwise, and the courts have uniformly so held." Bending v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N.E.2d 71, 75 (1944).
17 83 Ohio App. 102, 82 N.E.2d 548 (1948).
18 Id. at 550.
19 70 Ga. App. 181, 27 S.E.2d 871 (1943).
20 Id. at 872.
21 Id. at 876.
22 138 Ark. 442, 212 S.W. 310 (1919).
23 Ibid.
24 1 N.J. Super. 88, 62 A.2d 485 (1948).
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bile accident while on furlough. The court held that the insured had the status
of one in the Navy under an exclusion clause which denied accidental death
benefits "if death results from any cause while the insured is in the Military or
Naval Forces." 25 In speaking of this clause the court said: "It would be difficult
to express more clearly that the cause of death is immaterial to the question of
liability."
26
A recent case in which a status clause was held to preclude double indemnity
benefits was O'Daniell v. Missouri Ins. Co.,
2 7 decided by the Appellate Court
of Illinois for the Fourth District on November 3, 1959. In that case the insured,
serving in the Army, died as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile acci-
dent while he was on furlough. Clause (2) under "Exceptions" in the policy
provided:
There shall be no liability on the part of the company under the double
indemnity benefit of the policy if the death of the insured results from
suicide while sane or insane or from submarine diving or aeronautic opera-
tions as a passenger or otherwise, or while the insured is in military or
naval service of any country, or if any pre-existing ailment or disease
contributes with the bodily injury to cause the insured's death. (Emphasis
added.)
2 8
The main thrust of the plaintiff's argument was:
The whole idea of military exclusion is because of the greater risk to life
resulting from such service. The words "if the death of the insured re-
sults from" surely have meaning in this clause of one sentence, which
meaning is that if the death results from military service there is no double
indemnity. At least, can defendant say that such words are not susceptible
of 'such construction? .... .or at least render it ambiguous in that
respect?2
9
The plaintiff argued that even if the court would not construe the clause as
one of result, the clause was at least ambiguous, and ambiguities are to be re-
solved in favor of the insured. The court in rejecting this argument said: "This
phrase cannot be attached to the preposition, 'from,' because there is no such
English construction as this: 'results from while in military service.'"30 The court,
after a review of precedent, held the clause to be one of status, which afforded
immunity to the insurer for the entire length of the military service
1
The principal justification for the use of status clauses is the difficulty in
determining the manner or cause of death of the insured, particularly in time of
war or when the death occurs in a foreign country. 2 Nonliability flows from a
status clause when there is proof that the insured was in the military. The nature
of the cause of death is not material, whereas under a result clause it would be.
A supporting argument in the favor of status clauses is drawn from freedom of
contract. The situation envisualized is one wherein the insured bargains for an
area of coverage and insurance companies adjust their price accordingly. One
case went so far as to state, "That the conditions may be harsh does not affect
the rule, as no one is compelled to deal with the insurers on the basis of such
conditions.1
3 3
A contrary argument has been advanced on the contractual notion of failure
of consideration. According to this theory, if the insurance company is accepting
a premium for coverage and at the same time denying this coverage while the
insured is in the military service, there is a lack of consideration on the part of
25 Id. at 486.
26 Ibid.
27 24 III. App. 2d 10, 164 N.E.2d 78 (1959).
28 Id. at 79.
29 Brief for Appellee, pp. 2, 4, on file in the Notre Dame Law Library.
30 O'Daniell v. Missouri Ins. Co., 24 Il1. App. 2d 10, 164 N.E.2d 78, 79 (1959).
31 But see Edwards v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 210 La. 1024, 29 So. 2d 50 (1946); Benham
v. American Cent. Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612, 217 S.W. 462 (1920).
32 VANCE, INSURANCE § 101, at 638 (3d ed. 1951).
33 Hatch v. Turner, 145 Tex. 17, 193 S.W.2d 668, 669 (1946). Such a distinction
seems to be a little far from the truth as few purchasers of insurance ever go "clause shopping."
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the company. In Koplovitz v. New York Life Ins. Co.,34 the court held there was
no failure of consideration. where the exemption was a result clause since there
was coverage for nonmilitary risks. The court expressly left open the question
of whether there would be a failure of consideration if the clause had been one
of status. However, this argument was rejected in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Stagg, 5 where the court reasoned that the cash reserve which was accumulating,
together with the continued availability of life insurance after the insured's dis-
charge, was sufficient consideration.
Result Clauses
The insured's immunity under a result clause is dependent upon a finding of
causal relation between the event within the described area of exemption and the
death of the insured. Usually the sole question in these cases is whether the in-
sured did in fact die from causes peculiar to the military service. The essential
feature of these clauses, so far as the subject matter of this note is concerned,
is that deaths due to nonmilitary causes, such as from diseases or while on fur-
lough, are not excluded under policies incorporating these clauses. When death
has occurred from military causes there is no material difference between a status
clause and a result clause.
Where the courts have decided that a clause is one of result rather then
status, there has usually been some word or phrase indicating that death due to
military causes was intended. Sometimes the court was uncertain about part of
the clause, and this ambiguity was resolved in favor of the beneficiaries. The
typical result clause will contain such phrases as "death while engaged in war"
or "as the result of engaging in" military service.
In the following cases the courts had little difficulty in determining that
the clause in question was one of result, although in some, recovery was denied
due to a finding that the facts constituted a sufficient causal connection between
the death and the military service.
In Arendt v. North American Life Ins. Co.,36 the exclusion read: "This policy
insures the life of the insured against death occurring in any part of the world
and in any occupation, or from any cause, except military or naval service .... ,,37
Insured was drafted during World War I and while still in training he con-
tracted pneumonia and died. The court held the insurer liable when it concluded
that the death was not an incident of military service.
Bologna v. New York Life Ins. Co."' contained a war result clause which
provided that double indemnity for accidental death would not be payable "if
the insured's death resulted, directly or indirectly, from . . .war or any act in-
cident thereto .... , 9 The insured was a merchant seaman during World War II,
serving on a ship carrying war materials; he was killed when his ship collided
with another ship loaded with gasoline. The court denied recovery; the death
resulted from war activity although there was no direct conflict.
40
Neidle v. Prudential Ins. Co."' was another case involving a result clause; full
recovery was denied here on the ground that death resulted from military opera-
tions near the front. The exclusion barred accidental benefits only if "death re-
suited . . . from participating in military service." 42 Insured, while in military
34 101 N.Y.S.2d 745 (Mun. Ct., Syracuse 1947).
35 215 Ark. 456, 221 S.W.2d 29 (1949).
36 107 Neb. 716, 187 N.W. 65 (1922).
37 Id. at 66.
38 40 So. 2d 48 (La. App. 1949).
39 Id. at 49.
40 It is interesting to note that if the clause had been one of status the insurance company
would probably have been liable for the full amount of the double idemnity provision as it
was debatable whether the insured was in the military service. Id. at 52.
41 299 N.Y. 54, 85 N.E.2d 614 (1949).
42 Id. at 615.
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service during wartime, was killed while returning from the forward area when
his jeep collided with an Army ammunition truck. It should be noted that the
court expressly reserved the question of liability of insurer when death occurs
while the insured is on furlough.
4 3
In Smith v. Sovereign Camp W.O.W.,4 4 the insured was killed in an auto
accident while on furlough from the Navy. The exclusion clause provided:
This benefit does not cover . . . death caused directly or indirectly, wholly
or in part, by war, riot or insurrection, or any act incident thereto, either
on land or water; death resulting from any . . . military or naval serv-
ice. .... 45
The court in granting full recovery said that the facts failed to show increased
risk:
To hold that the terms of the policy apply where there is no connection
whatsoever between the accident and the enlistment in the Army or other
military service would seem to be an unfair discrimination not based on
sound reason and not actually expressed in the policy. Of course, the
language of the policy must be resorted to in order to ascertain its meaning
or correct interpretation. 46
Status Or Result?
The previously discussed cases would seem to establish a clear line of demar-
cation between status and result. The distinction fades when the insurer fails
to use such stock phrases as "while in the military service" or "as a result of mili-
tary service." The courts in these cases have had little choice but to interpret the
language as either status clauses or result clauses. Where these basic clauses are
changed to include some form of the word "engage," much litigation has arisen
as to which they are.
4 7
In Wolford v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 48 the insured was an Army captain
killed in an automobile accident en route to his home while on furlough. The
clause in the policy stated: "Disability and the Double Indemnity benefits... shall
terminate . . . in the event that the insured shall engage in military or naval
service in time of war." 49 The court in holding the clause applicable said:
[T]he insurer, by plain words, provided for the termination of the double
indemnity provisions upon the happening of an event. What event? The
contract answers this without ambiguity: "(In) the event that the insured
shall engage in the military . . . service in time of war." Since the event
bears no relationship to cause and effect, the policy terminated when
the insured entered the military service of the United States in time of
war, for then he was engaged in the military service and was required,
except for leaves or furloughs, to give his entire time thereto. We construe
the word "engaged" to mean "enter into" ... .50
Other cases where the word "engaged" was construed as connoting a status clause
are Reid v. American Nat'l Assur. Co.,5 ' wherein the life insurance policy pro-
vided for reduced benefits "if the insured shall die or become disabled while en-
gaged in naval or military service in time of war or in consequence of such serv-
ice" ;5 Field v. Western Life Indemnity,53 wherein limited benefits were payable
"if at any time the insured shall, without the company's written permission, en-
gage in military or naval service" ;54 and Mullen v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
43 Id. at 616.
44 204 S.C. 193, 28 S.E.2d 808 (1944).
45 Id. at 811.
46 Id. at 810.
47 For a comprehensive listing of cases on this subject see Day, The Applicability of War
Risk Exclusion Clauses to Deaths from Ordinary Causes, 19 RocxY Mr. L. Rav. 242, 247-53
(1947).
48 162 Pa. Super. 259, 57 A.2d 581 (1948).
49 Id. at 581.
50 Id. at 582.
51 204 Mo. App. 643, 218 S.W. 957 (1920).
52 Id. at 958.
53 227 S.W. 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
54 Id. at 531.
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Co.,15 5 where the applicable provision read "while the Insured is engaged in military
or naval service."56
On the other hand some courts have used the word "engage" when found
in an exclusion clause to signify result. In Benham v. American Central Life Ins.
Co.,57 the policy excluded full coverage for "death while engaged in military or
naval service in time of war, or in consequence of such service." 58 Insured, while
in the military service, died of influenza which at that time was prevalent through-
out the United States. The court held for the beneficiary, stating:
The word "engaged" denotes action. It means to take part in. . . . An
office'r engaged in the discharge of the duties of his office is one per-
forming the duties of his office. So here the words "death while en-
gaged in military service in time of war" mean death while doing, per-
forming or taking part in some military service in time of war; in other
words, it must be death caused by performing some duty in the military
service. 59
The exclusion clause in Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co.,6s was very similar
to the one in the Benham case. In reasoning that this was also a result clause the
court stated that:
If insured's mere status of being an enlisted soldier or sailor at the
time of his death is to give effect to the clause and reduce liability, what
necessity existed for saying therein that death must occur while insured
is "engaged" in any such service? The usual and ordinary . . . way of
expressing a man's status in that regard, where no idea or thought of
what he is doing therein is intended, is to say that he "is in the service,"
not that he is engaged in the service.6 '
Another case where the word "engage" was held to make the exclusion
clause one of result was Gipson v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,6 2 where the insured
died of a "pulmonary embolus" while in the Navy. The clause provided for re-
duced benefits "if . . . the Insured shall engage in military or naval service in
time of war" and fail to secure a permit from the company plus pay an extra
premium, which was not levied.63 In holding the clause inapplicable the court
relied heavily on letters from the president of the insurance company in which
he used the expression "should [those insured] lose their lives while engaged in
military service."164 The court reasoned that you do not speak of a person "losing
his life" when he dies from natural causes.6 5
The confusion that resulted from the use of the word "engage" prompted
many companies to eliminate it from their contracts at the start of World War
11.66
Another problem area in interpreting military exclusion clauses centers on
the use of the word "risk."(6 7 Other cases have put emphasis on phrases such as
"result of service."6 s Words and phrases such as "military service," "while serv-
55 179 F.2d 556 (3d Cir. 1950).
56 Id. at 557.
57 140 Ark. 612, 217 S.W. 462 (1919).
58 Ibid.
59 Id. at 463.
60 225 S.W. 106 (Mo. App. 1920), aff'd, 248 S.W. 923 (1923).
61 Id. at 107-108.
62 25 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 1946).
63 Id. at 845.
64 Id. at 847.
65 Ibid.
66 Day, supra note 47, at 253.
67 Atkinson v. Indiana Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 194 Ind. 563, 143 N.E. 629 (1924) (result
clause); Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N.W. 242 (1920) (status
clause).
68 Selenack v. Prudential Ins. Co., 160 Pa. Super. 242, 50 A.2d 736 (1947) (result
clause); Bending v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N.E.2d 71 (1944)
(status clause). Where the phrase reads "result of war," it is a result clause. Bologna v.
New York Life Ins. Co. 40 So. 2d 48 (La. App. 1949); Eggena v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
236 Iowa 262, 18 N.W.2d 530 (1945).
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ing, .... while enrolled," or "participating in" have at times also had particular
significance.69
Occasionally in these cases the courts will construe what would clearly ap-
pear to be a status clause as being inapplicable to the facts of the case and allow
full recovery. Some of these cases are: Edwards v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co.,7" where-
in liability was limited to the reserve on the policy if insured died "while enrolled
in military, naval, or air service in time of war,"7' and insured died of pneumonia
while serving with the Navy in Colorado; Young v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co.,7 2 where-
in the applicable clause provided for reduced benefits if death occurred "while
in" or "while enrolled in" military or naval service 7 3 and insured was killed in
an automobile accident while on furlough; and Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n v.
Daveney,7 4 where insured died of influenza in an Army training camp and the
court allowed full recovery, even though the policy excluded death "while in the
service in the army or navy of any government."75 These cases seem to refute
effectively the oft-expressed theory that result depends wholly upon phraseology.
Uniform Military Exclusion Clauses
The multitude of litigation that has arisen over the interpretation of military
exclusion clauses underscores the need for some sort of uniformity. However, agree-
ment on any uniformity is difficult due to the varied opinions of insurance planners
as to what degree of risk or exposure to the hazards of military service should
be assumed. The wording of any such clause also poses a problem; some courts
have been exacting in their interpretation of military exclusion clauses while others
have only looked at their literal meaning.
Our age is one of almost continuous cold war and occasional limited unde-
clared wars, but we stand under the ever present threat of a major global war
of unprecedented dimensions. This has caused two basic changes in the old type
of war exclusion clause; these should be taken into consideration in any uniform
military exclusion clause. First, the war reservation has been dropped by many
companies; and second, the exclusion of civilian casualties in wartime under the
exclusion clauses is now being used extensively.
The National Association of Life Insurance Commissioners, at the request
of the Life Insurance Association of America and the American Life Convention,
made a thorough study of the problem of uniformity in 1951 as a result of which
they formulated a statement of principles."6 The statement, which embodied a
result clause, sought to exclude deaths due to diseases or accidents which are
not attributable to the "special hazards incident to service."7 7 To meet the threat
of modern types of warfare, a civilian exclusion was provided for and the risks
of military service, regardless of whether in time of war or peace, were excluded.
The state of New York recognized the need for a modern type of a uniform
military exclusion clause and in 1951 enacted its present uniform clause, which
states:
No policy of life insurance . . . shall contain any provision which ex-
cludes or restricts liability in the event of death caused in a certain specified
manner, except the following provision, or provisions which in the opinion
of the superintendent are substantially the same or more favorable to
policyholders.
69 See Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 1018, 1037-40 (1954).
70 210 La. 1024, 25 So. 2d 552 (1946).
71 Id. at 551.
72 204 S.C. 386, 29 S.E.2d 482 (1944).
73 Id. at 483.
74 102 Okla. 302, 226 Pac. 101 (1924).
75 Id. at 103.
76 Report of the War Clause Subcommittee of the Life Committee, 1952 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NATIONAL AssOcIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 106, 106-07.
77 Id. at 107.
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Provisions excluding or restricting coverage in the event of death:
(a) As a result of war or an act of war, if the cause of death
occurs while the insured is serving in the military, naval or air forces
of any country, international organization or combination of countries
or in any civilian non-combatant unit serving with such forces, provided
such death occurs while in such forces or units or within six months
after termination of service in such forces or units.
(b) As a result of the special hazards incident to service in the
military, naval or air forces of any country, . . . if the cause of death
occurs while the insured is serving in such forces or units and is out-
side the home area, provided such death occurs outside the home area
or within six months after the insured's return to the home area ...
(c) As the result of war or an act of war, within two years from
the date of issue of the policy, while the insured is not in such forces
or units, if the cause of death occurs while the insured is outside the
home area; provided such death occurs outside the home area or within
six months after the insured's return to the home area.
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The statute then went on to define the terms "home area," "war," "act of war," and
"special hazards incident to service."
The statement of principles put forth by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners closely resembles the uniform military exclusion clause of the
state of New York.
Conclusion
The courts have shown a definite preference for result clauses over those
turning on status, and at times have gone to great lengths to make such an inter-
pretation. There are two reasons for this: First, the purpose of military exclusion
clauses is said to be the protection of the insurance company against the added
risks of military service. The boundary of the status clause not only covers this
added risk but goes on to encompass death from any cause while in military
service.
This unrealistic spirit of the Status clause in totally ignoring the cause
of death is inconsistent with the principle of insurance unless the insurer's
liability is materially increased by the particular risk involved. .... .9
Secondly, where the cause of death is one which is common to civilian life also,
it is statistically unjustifiable that the company under a status clause should refuse
to accept an ordinary risk it is being paid to assume. The anomalous situation
that results here is that the insured, when he is enrolled in the military service, is
not protected from the same risks that he would be protected from if he were
a civilian.
Although this judicial preference is warranted to a degree, it must be con-
demned when it reaches the point of definite misconstruction as in Edwards v.
Life & Gas. Ins. Co.,8 0 Young v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 81 and Illinois Bankers Life
Ass'n v. Daveney. 2 Such cases only add to the confusion already inherent in this
area. Insurance companies should be allowed to determine what risks they will
assume. The misfortune is that they should draw the line at the mere status of
the individual in military service.
One is compelled to admit that the best way to alleviate this confusion is
for the states to enact uniform military exclusion clauses similar to that of New
York. 3 This would lead to the uniform interpretation and application which is
essential to both insurance company and policy holder.
George A. Pelletier, Jr.
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